Review Article Volume 7 Issue 2
Delaware State University, USA
Correspondence: Samuel B Hoff, George Washington Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Department of History, Political Science, and Philosophy, Delaware State University, USA
Received: April 14, 2025 | Published: May 5, 2025
Citation: Hoff SB. Rejection: the veto record of the Biden presidency. Art Human Open Acc J. 2025;7(2):53-59. DOI: 10.15406/ahoaj.2025.07.00253
For presidential historians, it often takes several decades to position a former chief executive’s place in the pantheon of American presidents, and then only with the qualification that considerations and conditions can alter that regard over time. So it may seem unseemly if not unfair to venture a judgment of overall effectiveness within months of a president’s term ending. However, if such an evaluation is performed on a selected factor and meshes short and long-term comparisons, it can result in an accurate assessment. That is the goal of this research.
The purpose of the present study is to probe the veto record of the Joseph R. Biden administration, which served from January 2021 to January 2025. Initially, Biden’s background and legislative orientation is forwarded. Next, the record of the Biden administration with Congress is covered, from the standpoint of both consensus and conflict.
In the second section of the paper, President Biden’s veto record is compared in the short term to the chief executives who preceded and succeeded him: Barack Obama and Donald Trump. Further, an emerging veto pattern affecting several recent presidents is revealed. Next, there is a comparison between Joe Biden and the previous American president whose number of total vetoes was the same: Rutherford Hayes. Then, the study utilizes the presidential support model of veto behavior to identify factors which influence vetoes by, and overrides against, those chief executives from Benjamin Harrison until now who were not reelected. Lastly, the study offers a comparison of presidential greatness ranking with veto frequency by each chief executive since 1789.
The final part of the study assesses the performance of the Biden presidency on veto employment and overall.
Undoubtedly, Joe Biden’s background and core beliefs influenced his approach toward Congress once elected president.
Biden began his political career by earning a seat on the New Castle County Council in Wilmington, Delaware. From there, he jumped to the U.S. Senate after winning an upset victory against the incumbent in 1972 and becoming the fifth-youngest senator in history.1 Early on, Biden aligned with Southern senators who opposed busing to achieve integration, an experience from which he learned the benefits of bipartisanship.2 Over his 36-year Senate career, he served as chair of both the Judiciary Committee and Foreign Relations Committee. Building a national reputation, he used his stature to make runs at the presidency in 1988 and 2008, although both were unsuccessful.3 Following his failed 2008 presidential campaign, Biden was selected as vice president by the eventual victor that year, Barack Obama, and served as Obama’s contact with Congress. Partly due to the untimely death of his son Beau in 2015, Joe Biden deferred to Hilary Clinton as the Democratic nominee for president in 2016.4
Carla Hatch identifies six basic beliefs and ideas that formed Joe Biden’s leadership philosophy throughout his political career. The first component is empathy or sensitivity to others. The second belief is justice, so as to uphold rights against infringement. The third value is equality, so that everyone is treated fairly. The fourth belief is resilience, such that one should not give up after setbacks. The fifth value is courage, or bravery in the face of adversity. The sixth core held by Joe Biden is integrity.5
In the 2020 presidential race, Joe Biden emerged as the most electable Democratic nominee, in part due to his long record of government service. He then challenged President Donald J. Trump in the general election. Starting out strongly, Trump’s campaign for reelection was derailed by a combination of an inadequate response to the COVID-19 pandemic, an uncertain economy, and his own controversial views and behavior. In the end, Joe Biden won seven million more votes than Trump and collected 57 percent of the electoral vote.6
The events which followed the 2020 election were unprecedented in American history. After President Trump refused to concede, he engineered a flurry of events which resulted in multiple impeachments against him, a riot at the Capitol on January 6, 2021, and his departure from Washington without participating in inaugural ceremonies. President Biden’s inauguration on January 20, 2021 was held under armed guard.7
Once in office, President Biden outlined an ambitious legislative agenda despite narrow majorities in both legislative chambers. He hoped to steer bipartisan victories while respecting the authority of Congress. According to one analysis, Biden signed ten acts of Congress into law and issued 42 executive orders during his first 100 days as president. Many of the executive orders reversed policies or actions initiated by the Trump administration.8
By most accounts, the Biden White House had a good initial year in interacting with Congress. In addition to signing the American Rescue Plan Act in March 2021--a $1.9 trillion economic stimulus bill to confront the pandemic--the president signed the $1.2 trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act in November 2021, the latter of which garnered bipartisan support in Congress. President Biden helped to prevent two government shutdowns during his first year in office. Finally, Biden appointed more Federal judges to the bench than any first-year chief executive since Ronald Reagan.9 Overall, President Biden’s success rate on bills where the administration took a clear position neared 97 percent, according to CQ Roll Call’s annual vote study.10
On the negative side, the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan in late August 2021 led to a steep decline in public approval for President Biden, from which he was never able to completely recover.11 There was likewise criticism that the Biden team was seeking to accomplish too much as once.12
The Build Back Better bill, originally proposed in 2021, was tabled that year due to intraparty opposition. Instead, the Biden White House replaced that with the Inflation Reduction Act, a bill encompassing climate, health, and tax. The $700 billion bill was signed into law in August 2022, albeit with no Republican support.13 Still, the Biden team was successful in getting other major legislation enacted with bipartisan backing in 2022, including the Safer Communities Act, Chips and Science Act, Respect for Marriage Act, Electoral Count Reform Act,14 and Postal Service Reform Act.15 President Biden stated that signing the PACT Act—a bill he signed in July 2022 to provide benefits to veterans sickened by toxic exposure to burn pits—may have been the most emotional moment of his time in office.16 Overall, Congress supported the Biden White House on almost 95 percent of bills where it took a position, a second-year record among chief executives in the contemporary era.17
Conversely, the Biden administration saw legislative setbacks on several initiatives, including family-related policies as well as the president’s student debt relief plan. Along with those disappointments were the continuing challenges with immigration;18 spiraling inflation; and inconsistent public support for the president throughout 2022.19 These factors and others certainly contributed to the results in the 2022 midterm election, in which the Democrats retained control of the Senate but lost the majority in the House of Representatives. The resulting divided Congress “ensured legislative gridlock for the remainder of Biden’s term, with only essential funding bills and occasional bipartisan measures achieving passage.”20
Joe Biden was a protector of congressional prerogatives during his long Senate career. But with the new legislative alignment in 2023, he understood the need to guard Democratic gains using the tools of his office. He had seen previous presidents—Bill Clinton and Barack Obama among them—suffer massive losses in Congress in the midterm election yet be reelected, partly through aggressive use of the veto.21 Further, there is evidence that Biden’s fellow Democrats grew weary of his bipartisan approach, especially after the midterm election.22
The new House Republican majority brought the chamber to a legislative standstill amid leadership uncertainty, intraparty division, and rabid anti-Biden sentiment. The laws which were passed obstructed or sought to reverse the Biden agenda.
At their annual retreat in Baltimore in March 2023, President Biden and Democrats planned a revised legislative strategy that included vetoes.23 It also included veto threats, which Biden issued early in 2023 pertaining to any effort to cut Social Security or Medicare.24 President Biden issued his first veto on March 20, 2023. His action blocked a measure objecting to a Labor Department rule allowing retirement plans to account for various factors. A House vote on March 23 resulted in the veto being sustained by a 219-200 vote. After this initial move, Biden vetoed eight more proposals through the end of the year. The details of those vetoes are provided below:25
Date: April 6
Topic of Legislation: Disapproval of rule revising definition of “waters of the United States”
Reason Given For Veto: Would reverse authority to specify which waterways are subject to Federal jurisdiction; would cause uncertainty and slow economic growth
Disposition: House sustained veto on April 18, 227-196
Date: May 16
Topic: Disapproval of rule submitted to Department of Commerce rule on foreign duties
Reason Given: Would reinstate tariffs on solar imports opposed by administration
Disposition: House sustained veto on May 24, 214-205
Date: May 25
Topic: Disapproval of Comprehensive Policing and Justice Reform Act of 2022
Reason Given: Support for this law, which permits the District of Columbia authority to pass measures related to public safety
Disposition: House sustained veto on June 13, 233-197
Date: June 7
Topic: Disapproval of rule submitted to Department of Education pertaining to waiver and modification of student loans
Reason Given: Support for program and claim that Congress previously granted power to president in this area
Disposition: House sustained veto on June 21, 221-206
Date: June 14
Topic: Joint resolution disapproving of rule submitted to EPA on new air pollution standards
Reason: Would negatively affect public health and result in lost revenue for EV industry
Disposition: Senate sustained the veto on June 21, 50-50
Date: September 26
Topic: Joint resolution disapproving of rule submitted to U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service relating to endangered species
Reason: The lesser prairie chicken should remain on threatened species list
Disposition: Senate sustained veto on September 28, 47-46
Date: September 26
Topic: Joint resolution disapproving of rule submitted to U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service relating to endangered species
Reason: The northern long-eared bat should retain its status as threatened species
Disposition: Senate sustained the veto on September 28, 47-45
Date: December 19
Topic: Joint resolution disapproving of rule relating to small business lending under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Reason: Support for the rule, which requires banks to report small business financial information; bill would reduce accountability
Disposition: Senate sustained the veto on January 10, 2024, 54-45
According to one reliable analysis, the House took 724 votes but enacted just 27 laws in 2023.26 The CQ Roll Call annual vote study for 2023 confirmed the House’s level of opposition: of 54 votes taken where President Biden expressed a position, the Republicans supported him on 10, or 18.5 percent. While Senate stand success for the Biden team declined, that chamber still backed him more than 90 percent.27
Having vetoed nine bills or joint resolutions in 2023, President Biden vetoed four pieces of legislation during his final year in office. The vetoes are detailed below:25
Date: January 24
Topic: Joint resolution disapproving of rule submitted to Federal Highway Administration on electric vehicle charger requirements
Reason: Biden administration waiver allowed funded electric vehicle stations to ignore “made in America” mandate
Disposition: Senate sustained the veto on February 29, 50-47
Date: May 3
Topic: Disapproval of rule submitted to National Labor Relations Board
Reason: Support for rule establishing new standards for defining joint employer status
Disposition: House sustained the veto on May 7, 214-191
Date: May 31
Topic: Disapproval of rule submitted to Security and Exchange Commission relating to crypto currency
Reason: Rules establish guidelines to protect investors in this area
Disposition: House sustained the veto on July 11, 228-184
Date: December 23
Topic: Judicial understaffing delating getting emergencies solved (JUDGES) Act of 2024
Reason: Biden White House objected to adding 66 new positions to Federal judiciary
Disposition: Unchallenged
The story behind President Biden’s final veto bears telling. After the Senate passed the JUDGES Act unanimously with White House support in August 2024, the House majority blocked it from consideration. However, after Donald Trump’s election to a second term as president in November, House Republicans released the bill for floor action, knowing that Trump would get to nominate all the new posts created by the bill. The bill passed the House by a 236-173 vote. Support, in his veto message, President Biden questioned the motivation behind the bill, observing that the new judgeships were being created in states where senators where not filling existing judicial vacancies.29 The president’s action was roundly criticized by members of both parties as well as judicial branch personnel. Although the bill had passed with 58 percent bipartisan support, the lack of a two-thirds margin combined with the last-minute veto left it unchallenged as far as congressional override vote, the only such instance among President Biden’s 13 total vetoes.25
The CQ Roll Call vote analysis for 2024 reveals that, notwithstanding Joe Biden’s defeat at the hands of Donald Trump in the presidential election, he recouped support in both the Senate and House for bills where the administration took a position, earning a 72.7 percent average backing by both chambers.31
One way to gauge President Joe Biden’s veto behavior is to compare it with his immediate predecessor and successor, respectively. President Barack Obama vetoed one bill or resolution fewer than President Biden during his two terms in office. Two of Obama’s vetoes came during the 2009-10 period, when Democrats controlled Congress; Biden did not reject any legislation when Democrats were in the majority. Whereas only one of President Biden’s vetoes was unchallenged by either chamber, half of President Obama’s vetoes were unchallenged. Finally, President Biden had no vetoes overridden, whereas President Obama suffered one override, on his last veto of 2016. The veto was issued in response to the Justice against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which permitted lawsuits targeting those known to have taken part in the September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. Both the House and Senate overrode the veto five days after it was issued.32
President Donald Trump vetoed a total of ten bills or resolutions during his first term, three fewer than President Biden. Like Biden, all of Trump’s vetoes occurred during a period of split party control of Congress. Similar to Biden, Trump had one veto unchallenged, also the last of his term. However, President Trump suffered one veto override, pertaining to the National Defense Authorization Act for 2021. Overall, most of President Trump’s vetoes were on defense and national security bills he opposed, whereas more of the bills President Biden rejected dealt with domestic concerns.33
Overall, President Joe Biden may not have been as politically popular as either his predecessor or successor, but when it came to the veto, he was more successful than both.
American presidents have used the veto nearly 2600 times, of which pocket veto employment comprises 41 percent of that total. But a recent pattern discovered is that none of the last four chief executives have tapped this tool. It is possible that presidents have decided to replace use of traditional constitutional devices with quicker and less transparent ones, such as signing statements and national security “findings. Another reason for the precipitous decline of pocket vetoes may have to do with legislative tactics like permanent staffing during a recess or from one session to the next.34
When comparing President Joe Biden’s veto record to all chief executives who have served in American history, new information is revealed. For instance, a tally of total vetoes by all presidents offered in Table 1 shows that President Biden’s cumulative total matches that of only one other: Rutherford Hayes. However, President Hayes’ total includes one pocket veto, of which none were released by President Biden. Additionally, Hayes had the unfortunate distinction of having his first veto overridden.35
A second way to understand the Biden veto record in historical perspective is to utilize a tool which probes influences on vetoes and overrides in a systematic manner. One such tool is the presidential support model of veto behavior, originally employed to study vetoes and overrides of public bills,36 though later applied to private bill vetoes37 and pocket vetoes38 as well.
An expansion of the aforementioned model was formulated to investigate the veto behavior of non-reelected presidents from 1889 to 2025, which encompasses 13 chief executives, including Joe Biden. The veto part of the study includes a yearly count of vetoes of public bills by regular means by such presidents, which totaled 59. Using appropriate statistical tests, we find that the existence of military conflict together with increases in unemployment and pocket vetoes issued augment the probability of a veto transpiring in the first place. Once the decision is made to veto, we find that military conflict along with increases in unemployment, pocket vetoes, and number of legal residents from one year to the next all serve to increase veto frequency, whereas being a succession president, having high party support, and being threatened with impeachment act to decrease veto frequency by non-reelected presidents across the time span studied. It should be noted that all of the latter variables have a significant influence on the dependent variable(s) and that the entire model in both cases is significant at the .001 level [See Appendix #1].
Pertaining to Joe Biden alone, it is apparent that his veto use was impacted more by those factors dissuading veto use than by the ones fostering it.
We then turn to the override segment of the analysis. Here, the goal is to probe influences on likelihood of second-chamber (final) override. Again, only vetoes of public bills by regular means were included in the analysis. Across the time period studied, there were 61 such final override votes involving nine presidents, but not Joe Biden, as he suffered no veto overrides. Those variables which have a major influence on increasing likelihood of veto override involving non-reelected presidents are: (1) having the House as the second-chamber voting; (2) a domestic piece of legislation rather than one dealing with foreign or national security policy; (3) later in term by year; (4) being a succession president; (5) having high party support; (6) being threatened with impeachment; and (7) suffering a high percentage of override votes in the first chamber considering the veto. Together, the factors account for nearly half of the variance, and the entire model is significant at the .001 level. After predicting residuals, it is verified that the model increases the accuracy of 14 decisions, a 23 percent Improvement [See Appendix #2].
A third technique for placing Joe Biden’s veto record in long-term perspective is to compare every chief executive’s placement on a recent presidential greatness survey--that of Sienna College from 2022--with the total number of vetoes each issued. Table 1 shows these figures. When only the top-ten vetoing Presidents are included, there is .52 correlation between veto frequency and greatness rating. However, that figure drops to .21 when all presidents are encompassed. Joe Biden ranks #19 on the 2022 Sienna College presidential greatness poll.
President Regular Vetoes Pocket Vetoes Total Vetoes #Overrides 2022 Sienna |
G. Washington 2 0 2 0 3 |
J. Adams 0 0 0 0 16 |
T. Jefferson 0 0 0 0 5 |
J. Madison 5 2 7 0 10 |
J. Monroe 1 0 1 0 12 |
J.Q. Adams 0 0 0 0 17 |
A. Jackson 5 7 12 0 23 |
M. Van Buren 0 1 1 0 29 |
W. Harrison 0 0 0 0 40 |
J. Tyler 6 4 10 1 39 |
Z. Taylor 0 0 0 0 36 |
M. Fillmore 0 0 0 0 38 |
F. Pierce 9 0 9 5 41 |
J. Buchanan 4 3 7 0 44 |
A. Lincoln 2 5 7 0 2 |
A. Johnson 21 8 29 15 45 |
U. Grant 45 48 93 (5) 4 21 |
R. Hayes 12 1 13 1 31 |
J. Garfield 0 0 0 0 27 |
C. Arthur 4 8 12 1 33 |
G. Cleveland I and II 346 584 930 (1) 7 26 |
B. Harrison 19 25 44 (10) 1 34 |
W. McKinley 6 36 42 0 22 |
T. Roosevelt 42 40 82 (6) 1 4 |
W. Taft 30 9 39 1 25 |
W. Wilson 33 11 44 (10) 6 13 |
W. Harding 5 1 6 0 42 |
C. Coolidge 20 30 50 (9) 4 32 |
H. Hoover 21 16 37 3 37 |
F. Roosevelt 372 263 635 (2) 9 1 |
H. Truman 180 70 250 (3) 12 7 |
D. Eisenhower 73 108 181 (4) 2 6 |
J. Kennedy 12 9 21 0 9 |
L. Johnson 16 14 30 0 8 |
R. Nixon 26 17 43 7 28 |
G. Ford 48 18 66 (8) 12 30 |
J. Carter 13 18 31 2 24 |
R. Reagan 39 39 78 (7) 9 18 |
G. Bush 29 15 44 (10) 1 20 |
B. Clinton 36 1 37 2 14 |
G.W. Bush 12 0 12 4 35 |
B. Obama 12 0 12 1 11 |
D. Trump 10 0 10 1 43 |
J. Biden 13 0 13 0 19 |
The legislative productivity of the Biden White House during its first two years has been compared by some to that of Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson. That is quite the compliment, especially considering the Democrats’ narrow majority in Congress versus that which FDR and LBJ enjoyed and Vice President Kamala Harris’s record number of tie-breaking votes in the Senate.40 Clearly, Joe Biden’s default stance was to seek avenues of cooperation and bipartisanship in government, and he vetoed no legislation while his party controlled Congress. That his party lost control of one legislative chamber in the midterm election and he started using the veto is not surprising: a study of veto behavior from 1889 to 1997 revealed that the mean number of vetoes issued by presidents over that span increased from 3.63 during a period of unified control of the government to 6.07 during split party control of the presidency and Congress.41
Because President Biden was not prone to veto in the first place, and due to unique circumstances of the 118th Congress, he employed the veto defensively once forced to do so. He did not use the veto to punish, but rather to protect those policies he supported.
From the previous comparison of veto total with greatness ranking placement, it can be discerned that Americans do not judge the overall success of Joe Biden presidency by his veto proclivity, though they should appreciate him being the first chief executive since Lyndon Johnson not to have a veto overridden. And that is surely the way that Joe Biden wants it, for his judgment of legislative effectiveness stayed the same, whether in the Senate, as Vice President, or at the head of government: “The proof is in the bill signings (Table 1).”42
Appendix #1: veto behavior by non-reelected presidents, 1889-2025
Expanded presidential support model
Non-reelected presidents order of inclusion
Results via stata
Method: Probit Regression (Likelihood); Unit of Analysis: Year
Dependent Variable: Probability of a veto by a non-reelected president who served between 1889-2025 (Yes=1); mean: 39/59=66 percent
N=59; Iterations=6; LR chi(9)=32.75; Pseudo R2=.43; Prob>chi2=.0001; Residuals Prediction=+ 10 occurrences, +17 percent
Method: Poisson Regression (Frequency); Unit of Analysis: Year
Dependent Variable: Frequency of regular public bill vetoes by non-reelected presidents who served from 1889-2025; mean=4.23
N=59; Iterations=3; LR chi(9)=110.25; Pseudo R2=.24; Prob>chi2=.000 [See Appendix #1]
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z P>Z Mean |
|
Year -.27 .25 -1.05 .30 2.52 |
|
Succession -.71 .67 -1.05 .30 .22 |
|
Military Conflict 1.66 .77 2.16 .03 .19 |
|
N Public Laws -.0002 .002 -.09 .92 307 |
|
Partisan Support -.06 .04 -1.59 .11 55.0 |
|
Unemployment ,43 .16 2,71 .007 5.49 |
|
N of Pocket Vetoes .42 .17 2.41 .02 2.07 |
|
Impeach Threat -.16 .79 -.21 .84 .14 |
|
Increase Legal Res .64 .58 1.11 .27 .69 |
|
Constant 1.17 .34 .50 .62 |
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z P>Z Mean |
|
Year .10 .07 1.38 .17 2.52 |
|
Succession -.33 .18 -1.85 .06 .22 |
|
Military Conflict .60 .18 3.39 .001 .19 |
|
N Public Laws .0005 .0008 .66 .51 307 |
|
Partisan Support -.05 .008 -6.36 .000 55.0 |
|
Unemployment .05 .02 2.48 .01 5.49 |
|
N of Pocket Vetoes .09 .02 4.50 .000 2.07 |
|
Impeach Threat -.78 .25 -3.08 .002 .14 |
|
Increase Legal Res .31 .16 1.93 .05 .69 |
|
Constant 3.13 .59 5.32 .000 |
Appendix 1: Influences on Vetoes by Non-Reelected Presidents, 1889-2025
Appendix #2: veto override influenes on non-relected presidents, 1889-2025
Expanded presidential support model
Non-reelected presidents order of inclusion
Results via stata
Method: Probit Regression (Likelihood); Unit of Analysis: Each Second-Chamber Vote On Override
Dependent Variable: Probability of final override by non-reelected presidents serving between 1889-2025 (Yes=1); mean: 36/61=59 percent
N=61; Iterations=6; LR chi(11)=37.72; Pseudo R2=.46; Prob>chi2=.0001; Residuals Prediction=+14 occurrences, + 23 percent. [See Appendix #2].
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z P>Z Mean |
||
Second Chamber-House 1.76 .85 2.06 .04 .25 |
||
Domestic Legislation 2.15 1.10 1.97 .05 .69 |
||
Year Within Term .66 .39 1.69 .09 3.3 |
||
Succession 2.05 .76 2.70 .007 .43 |
||
Unemployment .14 .11 1.18 .24 6.36 |
||
Partisan Support .15 .06 2.67 .008 47.08 |
||
First Chamber % Override .14 .05 3.00 .003 81.00 |
||
N of Pocket Vetoes -1.06 .88 -1.21 .23 .80 |
||
Major Impeach Threat 2.77 1.34 2.07 .04 .08 |
||
Increase Legal Residents .68 .69 .98 .33 .57 |
||
Mil Conflict-Veto Message .91 .94 .97 .33 .28 |
||
Constant -23.7 6.90 -3.43 .001 |
Variable relation to final override likelihood
Variable Correlation Factor Uniqueness |
Second Chamber-House .11 .61 |
Domestic Legislation .08 .48 |
Year Within Term .05 .44 |
Succession .31 .39 |
Unemployment .06 .58 |
Partisan Support .07 .42 |
First House % Override -.02 .47 |
N of Pocket Vetoes -.07 .65 |
Major Impeach Threat .13 .49 |
Increase Legal Residents -.18 .45 |
Mil Conflict-Veto Message .22 .25 |
Appendix 2: Influences on Veto Overrides Affecting Non-Reelected Presidents, 1889-2025.
None.
Author declares that there is no conflict of interest.
©2025 Hoff. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and build upon your work non-commercially.